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Supreme Court Decisions
The editors announce that beginning with the October issue every
case decided by the Colorado Supreme Court since the last preceding
issue will be mentioned under this section, along with a brief notation
as to its subject matter and holding. This, it is hoped, will prove
useful in keeping the bar and bench in touch with all the current un-
reported cases. The practice of digesting and commenting upon peculi-
arly significant and interesting decisions will not be discontinued, al-
though shortage of space may require some abbreviation.
No. 14760. Livingston v. Utah-Colorado Lamb, Etc. Co., De-
cided June 10, 1940. Exemplary Damages Are Not Recoverable in
Tort Case Where Jury Finds No Actual Damages.
The general rule is recited to be that exemplary damages are not
recoverable in the absence of actual damages. Colorado, however, is
committed to the liberal view that upon a showing of actual damage,
even in the absence of proof or finding as to its amount, recovery of
punitive damages will be sustained. McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo.
461, 83 P. 135, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 358, 7 Ann. Cas. 896; Authorities
to the contrary are noted.
It is necessary to distinguish this case, where the finding was of
no actual damage, from a case of mere failure to find or assess actual
damages.
Judgment below on verdict for no actual damages and $100.00
punitive damages. Reversed.
No. 14690. Estate of Sabray Morrish; Wheeler v. Morrish, De-
cided June 24, 1940. "Person Aggrieved" With Respect to Appeals
from Judgments of the County Court in Estate Matters, as the Term
Is Used in Ch. 46, Section 165, C.S.A., Includes the Widower and Sole
Heir of the Deceased, who may carry an appeal from judgment allowing
a claim, although not technically a party'to the County Court action.
District Court accepted jurisdiction of the appeal. Affirmed.
No. 14763. Denny v. People, Decided July 1, 1940. A Sealed
Verdict in a Felony Trial, does not satisfy the requirements of Ch. 48,
Section 493, C.S.A. where the return of the same was delayed by the
action of the trial judge in instructing the jury in the absence of the de-
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fendant and his counsel that "Opening of Court for this case will be
January 30, 1940, at 10:00 A. M." A week of unexplained delay.
Conviction below of larceny from the person. Reversed.
No. 14741. Brannaman, et at. v,. Richlow Manufacturing Com-
pany, Decided July 1, 1940. Taxation Under State Unemployment
Compensation Act. Held that the non-paid secretary of plaintiff cor-
poration, is not an employee; therefore the corporation had less than
eight employees in 1937. and 1938 and was not subject to the tax paid
by it under protest.
The State contends:
(a) That the secretary is included under Section 19 (g) (1) de-
fining employment: "Employment means service performed for wages
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied."
(b) That she is included by Section 19 (f) (7) by reference
to the federal definition of "employee" contained in Section 1607 (i)
title 26 U.S.C.A.: "The term 'employee' includes an officer of a cor-
poration."
The court indicates some doubt as to the constitutionality of the
reference definition supposed under contention (b) above, if it were
indeed intended; but holds that in any case the State definition controls
and that it does not include the secretary. Judgment below invalidat-
ing the collection of the tax. Modified and affirmed. Bock, J., dissents.
No. 14789. Adams, et al. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado,
et al. Decided August 7, 1940. Course of Employment Under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Claimant was riding at the time of his injury with the driver of
employer's delivery truck. Testimony conflicting as to why he was
there, claimant asserting that it was to learn the route of the truck in
order to take over the delivery upon or in case of the absence of the
regular driver; employer that it was on mere joy ride.
On such conflicting evidence the finding below that claimant was
injured in the course of employment will not be disturbed. Judgment
for claimant affirmed.
No. 14604. Townsend v. Heath, et al., Decided June 10, 1940.
Oral Joint Contracts Are Not Joint and Several despite Ch. 92, Sec. 4
of C.S.A. and Section 14 of the Code. Dismissal below as to other
joint contractors and judgment for plaintiff against one defendant, re-
versed.
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No. 14650. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson
County, et al. u. The Rocky Mountain Water Co. Decided June 10,
1940. Injunction Against Enforcement of Confiscatory Water Rate
Allowed and Affirmed, the Supreme Court Refusing to Suggest a Rate.
No. 14777. Monte Investment Company v. Derby. Decided
June 10, 1940.
Appeal by defendant from judgment of Justice of the Peace in
unlawful detention action, without filing the additional bond for use
and occupation required by Ch. 70, Sec. 23 C.S.A. must be dismissed
on motion. The judgment for defendant is reversed.
No. 14759. Snyder v. Schmoyer. Decided June 17, 1940.
11. District Court has jurisdiction on Habeas Corpus writ by
one parent against another for the person of their child.
2. Dependency petition to give Juvenile Court jurisdiction must
be filed bona fide, for some real, not fancied, cause and not as an excuse
to relitigate questions previously decided by another Court. Decree
ordering custody of the child given to the father according to the judg-
ment of the Montana Divorce Court.
No. 14632. Cline, et al. v. Friend. Decided June 24, 1940.
Jurisdiction of damages on appeal bond conditioned to pay dam-
ages incident to delay as assessed by Supreme Court does not rest in
the district court but in the Supreme Court.
No. 14597. School District v. Faker. Decided July 1, 1940.
A school Board and its employee, a teacher, may compromise and
settle the latter's right to a pension.
No. 14617. Coates v. People. Decided July 1, 1940.
Sentence of death for murder in the first degree sustained. Certain
errors in the admission of evidence held non-prejudicial and judgment
affirmed.
No. 14387. Otto Lbr. Co. v. Water Supply and Storage Co.
Decided July 1, 1940.
Petition for change of point of diversion of water. District Court
held to have jurisdiction of petition by Wyoming Corporation despite
recent Colorado vs. Wyoming water litigation. Reversed.
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No. 14627. Midwest Mutual v. Heald. Decided July 17, 1940.
Action on written contract for attorney's fees. General allegation
in complaint of performance of conditions precedent and no specific
denial. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
No. 14657. Sweeney v. Peterson, et al. Decided June 17, 1940.
Reformation of trust on ground of mistake of trustor at the in-
stance of a donee who is not the "natural object of the donor's bounty",
here a mere stranger, will be denied. Trial court denied relief. Affirmed.
No. 14796. Workmen's Compensation; Statute of Limitations.
Decided August 7, 1940. Weidensaul v. Industrial Commission, et al.
District Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
In Dept.
HELD: 1. Where claimant's doctor is told that employer would
resist claim on ground claimant was an independent contractor and
doctor fails to notify claimant and more than one year elapses before
claim is made, it is fault of claimant since doctor was his agent.
2. There is nothing in the record to convince court that claim-
ant should be excused from compliance with statute because of physical
and mental incapacity. Record shows that while he suffered from
shock for a few days after accident, he admitted he was mentally alert
thereafter and that his niece volunteered to look after the matter for him.
3. Claimant has precluded himself from being covered by case
of Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P. (2d) 397, by
admitting he entrusted the whole matter to his friend, the doctor.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur.
No. 14627. Attorney and Client; Contracts; Pleading. De-
cided July 17, 1940. Midwest Mutual, Inc. v. Heald. District
Court, Denver. Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
HELD: I. In a suit on a contract for legal services, the allega-
tion that the plaintiff "has duly performed all the conditions of said
contract, on his part to be done and performed," while essentially a
legal conclusion, is proper and in compliance with the Code of Civil
Procedure ('35 C. S. A., Volume 1, Page 155, Section 72).
2. Although plaintiff had prepared the articles of incorporation
for the corporators of the defendant corporation, he did not become the
attorney for the corporation until about a year later. The contract
was not entered into during the existence of the fiduciary relationship
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of attorney and client, and therefore it was not incumbent upon him to
prove the fairness.and reasonableness of the contract or the reasonable
worth of the compensation provided for.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the
defendant permission to file a second amended answer, tendered after
the case had been called for trial and the jurors had been empaneled
and sworn.
4. Although the contract gave the defendant the option of pay-
ing plainftiff in investment certificates rather than cash, under the facts,
even if the alleged error had been properly assigned, the supreme court
holds that the trial court did not err in entering a money judgment.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Jus-
tice Knous concur.
No. 14561. Zoning. People ex rel. Gromrnmon v. Hedgcock,
etc. Decided May 24, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry
S. Lindsley, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
FACTS: A. Action brought to compel building inspector of the
City and County of Denver to issue a permit for the construction of a
"bungalow court" in a "Business B" district.
B. The lower court found that the design of the proposed im-
provement made it in fact an "automobile tourist camp" and refused
the relief requested.
HELD: 1. It is admitted that under Section 3B of the zoning
ordinance, the erection of a multiple dwelling, hotel, dormitory or
boarding house or rooming house is a permitted use in a "Business B"
district.
2. A structure having a central building, with a central heating
plant, surrounded by sixteen apartments, with bath, kitchenette, living
room, and bedroom in each, available to permanent tenants and tran-
sients, is a bungalow court and falls within the classification of a mul-
tiple dwelling and not an "automobile tourist camp."
3. It is of no consequence that the structure may or probably will
be rented to transients.
4. " 'The power to limit the use of real estate in particular
districts must be expressely granted or rise by necessary implication.' "
"The police power, which is the legal basis for zoning regulations, must
constantly be reconciled with the legitimate use of private property in
harmony with such guarantees."
5. Section 4, Article VI of the zoning ordinances requires the
issuance, in a "Business B" district, of a permit for the erection of any
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structure intended or designed to be used for "* * * any use not pro-
vided for as a permitted use in any other district * * *."
6. The name used to designate the structure is immaterial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur. Mr.
Justice Bakke dissents.
No. 14690. Estates; Appeal by Heir; Bond. In re Estate of
Marrish. Wheeler v. Marrish. Decided May 24, 1940. District
Court Larimer County. Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge. Affirmed.
In Dept.
HELD: 1. "Any person aggrieved" may take an appeal from
the county court to the district court; and this includes an heir who
objects to a judgment of the county court on a claim against the estate.
2. There is no statutory provision requiring an order from the
county court allowing such appeals if a bond is filed and approved
within ten days after the order or decree of the county court has been
rendered. It is only where time is asked "upon good cause" that any
order of the court is necessary.
3. Although there may have been some informalities in con-
nection with the giving of the bond, the sureties thereon apparently
were responsible, and, the bond having been duly approved by the
court, any imperfections could be corrected under the provisions of Sec-
tion 168, Chapter 46, 1935 C.S.A.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Burke concur.
No. 14632. Appeal and Error; Damages; Bond. Cline, et al.
v. Heron. Decided May 24, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon.
Joseph J. Walsh, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
• FACTS: A. Lower court, in previous trial gave judgment for
possession of real estate and damages to plaintiff. Defendant went to
supreme court on writ of error and posted bond providing for the pay-
ment of the judgment, interest and costs and "any damages which may
be awarded by said supreme court in consequence of the delay occa-
sioned by said writ of error," etc.
B. The supreme court affirmed judgment of lower court, posses-
sion was returned to plaintiff and the judgment of lower court paid.
C. Thereafter plaintiff prosecuted proceedings in lower court
and obtained further judgment for damages occasioned by defendant's
possession of property during proceedings on writ of error.
HELD: 1. Lower court had no jurisdiction on latter matter
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because condition of bond was that the subsequent damages, if any,
were to be determined by the supreme court.
2. A motion or petition to assess damages should have been filed
in the supreme court.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Justice
Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bock not participating.
No. 14597. School Teachers' Pensions; Compromise; School
Districts. School District No. 1, Denver, etc. v. Faker. Decided
July 1, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge.
Reversed. En Banc.
FACTS: A. Suit brought under Declaratory Judgment Act
to have determined whether, under the facts alleged, plaintiff, a school
teacher, is entitled to a pension under Sections 250-254, Chapter 146,
1935 C.S.A.
B. Differences had arisen between teacher and school district
and after much conflict and litigation a release agreement was entered
into whereby her then pending mandamus action to reinstate her
was dismissed with prejudice.
C. The teacher now seeks to avoid the effects of the release on
the ground that the school district had no authority to compromise
and enter into the release agreement.
HELD: 1. School districts may sue or be sued and they have
the power to compromise actions and claims.
2. The law favors compromises and settlements of disputed
claims.
3. The alleged statutory right of a teacher to a pension may
be waived or released by her.
4. Whether teacher did or did not have proper legal advice at
time of agreement can not control judgment of court in this action.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.
No. 14763. Criminal Law; Sealed Verdicts. Denny v. People.
Decided July 1, 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Where, in a criminal trial, it is agreed that the jury
may bring in at opening of court a sealed verdict, it was error for the
trial court to instruct the jury that the opening of the court would be
January 30, 1940 (a week later than the verdict ordinarily would
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have been returned), where such part of the istruction was included
without presence, knowledge or consent of defendant or his attorney.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
No. 14617. Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Motive; Wit-
nesses. Joe Coates v. People. Decided July 1, 1940. District
Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. En
Banc.
HELD: 1. In a murder trial, it was permissible to show other
crimes where they show a motive for the crime charged, that being one
of the elements of the crime.
2. Evidence of assaults and threats prior to the killing are part
of the res gestae and admissible; and although some of the evidence
was immaterial and incompetent when the same elements of conduct
continued down to the very evening of the scene, they constitute an
inseverable chain of circumstances and are admissible.
3. Surprise, permitting cross-examination of prosecution's own
witness by prosecution, ordinarily may not be claimed unless the
testimony of the witness is affirmative, hostile or prejudicial to the
party by whom he was called. But the rule is subject to some excep-
tions, for example, where it appears that a witness is giving testimony
contrary to the reasonable expectation of the party calling him, such
party should be allowed to cross-examine such witness for the purpose
of refreshing his recollection. The trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion under the facts in permitting the cross-examination.
4. While it may have been error for the court to permit the in-
troduction in evidence of a statement made by one witness a short
time after the homicide, it was not prejudicial.
5. " 'While in itself, as a general proposition, the circumstance
that the court excluded similar evidence may not justify the admission
of that which is improper, it may mitigate the transgression.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Chief
Justice Hilliard dissent.
No. 1475 1. Unemployment Compensation; Employees. Bran-
naman, et al. v. Richlow Manufacturing Company. Decided July 1,
1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge.
Modified and affirmed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Words and phrases are to be construed according
to the common and approved usage of the language unless they have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law.
2. One who acts as a company's secretary, receiving no wage,
and whose duties are limited to the performance of the formal functions
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required by the statutes and the company's by-laws, and who per-
forms no other service for it is not in the "employment" of the com-
pany within the meaning of the Colorado Unemployment Compen-
sation Act.
3. While the state act adopted the definition of "employment"
as set out in the Federal Act, it can not be said that where the state
act specifically defines a term, the Federal Act may broaden or restrict
the state definition.
4. It was not the intention of the state legislature to repeal its
definition of "employment" by adopting Section 19 (f) (7) of Chap-
ter 167A, 1939 Supp. 1935 C.S.A.
5. The allowance of interest on the refund of the tax paid was
erroneous. (Section 14 (c) of the Act.)
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock dissents.
No. 14613. Negligence; Physicians and Surgeons. Pearson v.
Norman. Decided July 1, 1940. District Court, Pueblo. Hon.
Harry Leddy, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. In an action against a physician for negligence in
diagnosis and treatment of a spinal injury, it was error for the trial
court to non-suit the plaintiff where there was evidence of plaintiff
that defendant told him there was no fracture and sent him home and
gave him no further treatments, and where evidence showed there was
a fracture and the plaintiff did not get well. It was a matter for the
jury.
2. Negligence may consist of either wrongful action or wrong-
ful inaction.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
No. 14745. Workmen's Compensation. Industrial Commis-
sion v. McKenna, et al. Decided July 1, 1940. District Court, Lake
County. Hon. William H. Luby, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. 'There is no provision in the law requiring widow
to permit autopsy on body of deceased husband in order to be en-
titled to benefits of workmen's compensation.
2. Acute heart dilation brought on by overexertion is an acci-
dent within meaning of statute.
3. Circumstantial evidence and opinion evidence of a qualified
physician, uncontradicted, is competent to establish the fact.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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No. 14387. Water Rights. Otto Lumber Company v. Water
Supply and Storage Company. Decided July 1, 1940. District
Court, Larimer County. Hon. Frederick W. Clark, Judge. Re-
versed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. A statutory proceeding for change in point of diver-
sion has a 'limited scope and an extraneous issue cannot be litigated
therein.
2. A decree must be accepted at its face value. If the decree
for some reason other than lack of jurisdiction appearing on its face,
should be vulnerable to attack, the attack can not be collateral, but
must be made directly in an appropriate action other than the statutory
proceeding itself.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young dissents.
No. 14667. Instructions. Jackson v. Trainor. Decided July
1, 1940. County Court, Crowley County. Hon. E. M. Stroud,
Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. As a general rule, in instructing the jury, non-
direction constitutes prejudice only if a proper instruction is tendered
by the complaining party to fill the alleged gap.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
No. 14757. Criminal Law; Operating Auto Under Influence
of Liquor; Principal and Accessory. Quintana v. People. Decided
July 1, 1940. District Court, Boulder County. Hon. Claude C.
Coffin, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that two parties, P. and the de-
fendant, were in an automobile which struck another car causing the
death of an occupant of the latter, and that some time later both par-
ties, under influence of liquor and covered with blood were found,
separately, away from the scene of the accident; where it appears that
both had been in the car, both were intoxicated, neither knew much
about the accident, and each accused the other of driving the car, and
where it appears that the car was owned by P.'s father, and P.'s driver's
license was found in the car, there might be sufficient evidence that P.
was the principal, but there is no competent evidence that would estab-
lish defendant as a principal.
2. It is not sufficient to make the defendant an accessory to show
only that he was in the car and under the influence of liquor at the
time of the accident. There was nothing in the evidence to show that
he gave any encouragement, by word or act, to the commission of the
offense of causing a death by operating a car while under the influence
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of liquor in a careless and reckless manner, and with wanton and reck-
less disregard of human life and safety.
3. Under such facts, where both are tried together and con-
victed, there may be sufficient evidence to establish that defendant was
an accessory during the fact, but he can not be considered as a prin-
cipal and punished as such. The penalty being different, it is a distinct
offense.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
No. 14670. Constitutional Law; Pensions for Justices of
Supreme Court; Pensionable Status; Severability; Statutory Construc-
tion. Bedford, etc. vs. White and Adams. Decided April 8, 1940.
District Court, Denver. Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed.
En Banc.
HELD: 1. Supreme Court justices who reached the statutory
age of retirement while in office and while the act was in effect, may
receive pensions from the state.
2. A pensionable status as to original grant will support a claim
to a later increase.
3. If the official was not in office when the act became operative
he must at least have reached the specified age while in office, or if not
reaching that age until out of office, the act must have been applicable
while he was in office in order to establish a "pensionable status".
4. The claimants in this case are not entitled to the pensions
since neither was in office when the legislation became effective, and
neither reached the statutory age until after the expiration of the service;
and the pension act could have no possible effect on inducing them to
enter the service, remain in it or retire from it.
5. As to these claimants the pension is either extra compensa-
tion after the service has been rendered, a violation of Section 28,
Article V, State Constitution, or an appropriation for a benevolent
purpose, in violation of Section 34, Article V, or both.
6. As to the status of former Justice Garrigues, no decision
made since he is not a party, except to point out distinctions to effect
that while he was not in office when act was passed, he did reach
statutory age before retiring, and also, his pension has been paid for
a long period of time without question.
7. Persuasive argument for the constitutionality of an act,
where the question is a close one, is a "contemporaneous construction,"
or long continued construction and action by other departments of
the government charged therewith.
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8. The act of 1925 has never been questioned, and the act of
1939 is a mere extension of it. "The conclusion is irresistible that
had the law makers known that their attempted inclusion of" a class
of people into which the claimants fall "was invalid they would have
passed the bill with that class excluded. Legislative intent is thus clear
and in such case the invalid provision of the statute falls and the valid
stands. This is a well known rule of severability."
9. The rule of severability is equally applicable where the valid
and void provisions of an act are found in the same section.
10. Where the enacting words of a later act are, "amended to
read as follows", and the repealing section is "all acts and parts of
acts in conflict", the rule as to such legislation is that: "the portion of
the original which is reenacted in substance is not repealed, but the
amendment is construed as an uninterrupted continuation thereof.
Substantial changes, new matter, and repeals by omission, are considered
as new legislation and hence to be construed as such."
11. The Supreme Court Pension Act of 1939 is invalid only
so far as it includes those not included in the act of 1925, not in office
when either was effective and not in office when they reached the age
provided by either.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.
No. 14634. Trusts; Receivers; Equity; Jurisdiction. Melville
et al. v. Weybrew et al. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Den-
ver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS: A. Plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be holders of cer-
tificates of beneficial interests in the defendant District Landowners
Trust, filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the trust and distribu-
tion of its assets to the beneficiaries on the ground that the alleged pur-
pose of the trust was to secure certain water rights or construct an irri-
gation system and that because of its inability to perform such service,
the trust failed and no longer needs to continue its existence.
B. Certain other charges were made against the trustees, such as
commission of ultra vires acts and misapplication and conversion of
funds. An accounting was sought.
C. Also a petition for appointment of a receiver pendente lite was
filed. The trial court granted the petition for a receiver and matter was
taken to Supreme Court under Rule 18.
HELD: 1. The district court has jurisdiction in fields of equity:
and the jurisdiction over trusts, being always within the domain of a
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court of equity, such court has the power to terminate a trust and have
the property distributed where the trust is impossible of fulfillment.
2. A court of equity has inherent power to displace trustees by
substituting a receiver whenever the case is brought within the general
equitable principles concerning the appointment of receivers.
3. A receiver may be appointed for a trust, where action is pend-
ing, to determine the distributive shares of the beneficiaries.
4. Appointment of a receiver ordinarily rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court.
5. Where certain beneficiaries of a trust allege they have an equi-
table right in, and claim to, the subject matter, they have the right to
maintain the action and ask ancillary equitable relief without the joinder
of other beneficiaries under the trust.
6. A beneficiary of a trust may bring suit to terminate it, where
the trust has expired, notwithstanding a provision in the declaration of
the trust to the effect that he shall not do so "except, at the expiration
of the term of this trust." He has a right to have the court determine
whether or not the trust has expired.
7. Under the allegations, mere injunctive relief would not con-
stitute adequate, complete and effectual remedy to plaintiffs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Bock and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.
No. 145 19. Insurance; Date of Policy; Grace Period; Extension
Insurance. Business Men's Assurance Co. v.. Davies, et at. Decided
April 8, 1940. District Court, La Plata County. Hon. John B.
O'Rourke, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. The effective date of a policy of life insurance is that
date agreed upon and long recognized by the parties as shown by the
policy, correspondence between company and assured and conduct of
the parties.
2. Where a clause in the policy provides that if the cash or loan
value is not sufficient to cover the next premium, upon failure to pay
the premium, it shall automatically be extended from the date of default
and for such period as would be paid by the cash surrender value, the
grace period and the extension period run from the same date; the grace
period does not begin to run after the expiration date of the extended
insurance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur.







HOWARD B. ALLEN, Manager
710 Railwary Exchange Bldg.
CHerry 6521




A Denver attorney said to us not long
ago, "Why shouldn't I recommend you?
The monument was well finished, your




920 Speer Blvd. CHerry 4728
Manufacturing Plant-94 So. Santa Fe
Now it can be told: the SECRET
recipe of the ORIGINAL, AU-
THENTIC Carioca Zombie:
% oz. Pineapple Juice (unsweetened)
% o*.. Papaya Nectar (canned)
Juice of I good sized lime
I barspoon powdered sugar
% oz. Apricot Brandy
I or. CARIOCA RUM Tropical Heavy Bodied
90 Proof
2 oz. CARIOCA RUM Gold Label-86 Proof
I oz. CARIOCA RUM White Label-86 Proof
I dash CARIOCA RUM Tropical Heavy Bodied
151 Proof
Shake well with cubed or cracked Ice and
pour entire contents of shaker, without strain-
ing, into Zombie glass (14 oz. frosted glass).
Add 3 oz. plain water and cracked toe to fill.
Dress up with sprig of mint. 1, in. souare of
sliced pineapple and one green and one red
cherry-pierc* frits with a toothpick.
Place toothpick on glass so that the fruits
are suspended over the drink.
Float the dash of CARIOCA RUM Tropical
Heavy Bodied-151 Proof--on top of the drink.
Sprinkle powdered sugar on top and serve
with straws.








The new Payne a gas furnace heats, mrc.
lates humWidih and hier the air in your home--nd
malntains Jus the degree of warmth a you desi.-
all automattaily.
By using two or mme Zoa unisyou can heat
n thoe pordam of your home whee wamth i
needed
Its stramuned beauty helps t tasdorm you
basum Into a gay playroom.
mew Poay
Zwaor gms




Public Service Company of Colorado
A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpt is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Associ-
ation by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,




"Action or lack of action by a corporate trustee in a given matter
is not the result of impulse or of sudden notion-rather, it results
from consideration, study and deliberate judgment, usually, of a group
constituting a trust committee.
"This committee acts collectively; it approves or disapproves,
authorizes or rejects, and the record of its acts is a permanent archive
of the bank. Under its supervision and control are the various em-
ployees and officers who actually look after and handle the trust
property-available to it are all of the information and data about any
given question or matter that the various departments of the bank or
trust company can assemble or provide."
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Each of the institutions named below acts
as Executor and Trustee:
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE, AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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